The following appeared in the Tuesday April 15 issue of the Financial Times on page 24. This is a warning to what will happen to the United States government if we do not get our borrowing and spending under control.
By Stacy-Marie Ishmael on why the municipality is facing the prospect of a major default
Alabama’s Jefferson County, one of the most indebted US municipalities, will today try to persuade creditors to extend the deadline for a $184m payment in its efforts to stave off default on its broader obligations.
Jefferson County has around $4.6bn in outstanding debt, and a default on that scale would dwarf 1994’s Orange County debacle, in which the California county defaulted on some $1.6bn in debt.
The country’s financial problems – it has already missed a series of payments to banks led by JPMorgan – are directly linked to the credit crisis that has rattled both Wall Street and Main Street.
Jefferson County has been hurt by soaring interest rates on the $3.2bn of debt it issued since 1997 to fund a sewer project. Investors started demanding higher interest rates in part because of problems facing the bond issuers that had guaranteed that debt, and partly as a result of a broader collapse in the auction-rate securities market, much used by municipal borrowers and where interest rates are set by auction every seven to 35 days.
County Commissioner Bettye Fine Collins said interest costs for the sewer project financing could reach $250m – almost twice the $138m in revenue the sewer system generates – if the county is unable to restructure the debt.
The county’s woes have been compounded by a series of complex agreements it entered into with Wall Street banks earlier this decade.
The agreements, known as interest rate swaps, were designed to reduce the risk and cost to the county of issuing variable-rate debt.
The swaps allowed Jefferson County to make fixed payments to investment banks including Lehman Brothers and Bank of America, and in return to receive floating payments linked to 3-month Libor.
But this strategy, which had been the favourite of municipalities across the nation, turned sour when the market for auction rate securities froze and three-month Libor started to fall. In other words, Jefferson County faced rising interest rate payments at a time when the swap contracts were paying out less than before.
Moreover, after the county skipped a $53m principal payment earlier this month, ratings agencies cut its credit ratings to the lower end of the investment grade spectrum. Those cuts triggered clauses in the swap agreements that allowed Jefferson’s creditors to demand $180m in additional collateral – money the county did not have.
Jefferson has already missed one such deadline, and a second one expires today. Unless it can persuade its banks to renegotiate the terms of the agreements, it may be pushed into bankruptcy, county officials said.
“If we don’t extend [the deadline], were basically calling in bankruptcy at that point in time,” county commissioner Jim Carns told the Birmingham News last week. But Alabama state officials are working to prevent such an outcome.
The state Senate has approved resolutions that would prevent the county from unilaterally declaring bankruptcy, for instance.
UPDATE:
The Wednesday April 16, 2008 issue of the Wall Street Journal gives an update on the Jefferson County story on page C2.
Alabama County Votes To Delay Debt Payment
Alabama’s Jefferson County Commission voted Tuesday afternoon to approve an agreement with banks that allows the county to further delay a $53 million payment on its municipal sewer debt.
This measure gives the county, which includes Birmingham, more time to negotiate a rescue plan necessary to avoid bankruptcy. Such a bankruptcy would represent the largest-ever municipal default, roughly double the size of the Orange County, Calif., debt default in 1994.
A representative for Jefferson County Commission President Bettye Fine Collins said the five-person commission voted unanimously to approve an extension of the county’s existing forbearance agreements with banks, bond insurers and swaps counterparties related to the county’s sewer debt.
The representative couldn’t confirm the length of the extension that was agreed upon, and referred queries to the office of the county attorney, who didn’t immediately return a phone call.
Showing posts with label Financial Times. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Financial Times. Show all posts
Monday, April 21, 2008
Saturday, April 19, 2008
Economist Kaufman says Fed failed as regulator
The following appeared on page 20 in the Monday April 14, 2008 issue of the Financial Times.
By Aline van Duyn in New York
Henry Kaufman, the distinguished Wall Street economist, has added his voice to the debate about the Federal Reserve’s role in the credit crisis, saying the central bank failed to give enough importance to its role as a regulator.
In a video interview with the Financial Times, Mr Kaufman criticized the Fed’s monetary policy. He said it allowed too much credit expansion over the past 15 years and that this contributed to the market turmoil.
“Certainly the Federal Reserve should shoulder a substantial part of this responsibility…it allowed the expansion of credit in huge magnitudes,” Mr Kaufman said.
“Besides its monetary policy approach, [the Fed] really indicated very clearly that it was performing its role as a supervisor…in a minute fashion, not in an encompassing fashion. Monetary policy had a high priority, supervision and regulation within the Fed had a smaller policy.
Mr Kaufman, who is on the board at Lehman Brothers, has long advocated tougher regulation of the biggest financial firms, arguing that they need to be made “too good to fail”, rather than remain “too large to fail”.
The near-collapse of Bear Stearns last month, and the Fed’s intervention which resulted in a purchase of the Wall Street firm by JPMorgan Chase, has triggered a renewed debate about whether banks can regulate themselves, or whether regulators need to impose tougher rules.
The credit crisis, which stems from losses on securities backed by risky mortgages made during the height of the housing bubble, could lead to total writedowns of nearly $1,000bn for banks and investors around the world, according to the International Monetary Fund.
Mr Kaufman said a distinctive feature of the financial crisis was “much greater lapses in official supervision and regulation than in earlier periods”.
He said there should be a new federal regulator appointed who would work with the Federal Reserve but who would have responsibility for “intensively” regulating the 30 or 40 biggest financial firms. Failure to do so could lead to a “crisis that’s bigger than the one which we have today”.
“The supervision of major financial institutions requires deep skills in credit, deep skills in risk analysis techniques and it requires within that organization, very skilled, trained professional people,” Mr Kaufman said. “That is lacking in the supervisory area in the United States.”
He added that recent proposals from Hank Paulson, secretary of the US Treasury, to overhaul US regulation “lack focus”.
By Aline van Duyn in New York
Henry Kaufman, the distinguished Wall Street economist, has added his voice to the debate about the Federal Reserve’s role in the credit crisis, saying the central bank failed to give enough importance to its role as a regulator.
In a video interview with the Financial Times, Mr Kaufman criticized the Fed’s monetary policy. He said it allowed too much credit expansion over the past 15 years and that this contributed to the market turmoil.
“Certainly the Federal Reserve should shoulder a substantial part of this responsibility…it allowed the expansion of credit in huge magnitudes,” Mr Kaufman said.
“Besides its monetary policy approach, [the Fed] really indicated very clearly that it was performing its role as a supervisor…in a minute fashion, not in an encompassing fashion. Monetary policy had a high priority, supervision and regulation within the Fed had a smaller policy.
Mr Kaufman, who is on the board at Lehman Brothers, has long advocated tougher regulation of the biggest financial firms, arguing that they need to be made “too good to fail”, rather than remain “too large to fail”.
The near-collapse of Bear Stearns last month, and the Fed’s intervention which resulted in a purchase of the Wall Street firm by JPMorgan Chase, has triggered a renewed debate about whether banks can regulate themselves, or whether regulators need to impose tougher rules.
The credit crisis, which stems from losses on securities backed by risky mortgages made during the height of the housing bubble, could lead to total writedowns of nearly $1,000bn for banks and investors around the world, according to the International Monetary Fund.
Mr Kaufman said a distinctive feature of the financial crisis was “much greater lapses in official supervision and regulation than in earlier periods”.
He said there should be a new federal regulator appointed who would work with the Federal Reserve but who would have responsibility for “intensively” regulating the 30 or 40 biggest financial firms. Failure to do so could lead to a “crisis that’s bigger than the one which we have today”.
“The supervision of major financial institutions requires deep skills in credit, deep skills in risk analysis techniques and it requires within that organization, very skilled, trained professional people,” Mr Kaufman said. “That is lacking in the supervisory area in the United States.”
He added that recent proposals from Hank Paulson, secretary of the US Treasury, to overhaul US regulation “lack focus”.
Friday, April 18, 2008
FT: A towering disciplinarian
The frugal former Fed chief blames the current crisis on lack of restraint, says Chrystia Freeland.
This article appeared in the April 12-13, 2008 weekend edition of the Financial Times on page 7.
In an age when Manhattan financiers own helicopters to escape the traffic on their weekend treks to the Hamptons, Paul Volcker embodies the customs of another time. The 80-year old former chairman of the US Federal Reserve astonishes his hosts at New York dinner parties by asking where the nearest subway stop is; and, according to William Neikirk, one of his biographers, when he was running the world's most important central bank Mr Volcker ferried his dirty washing from his modest Washington crash pad to his daughter's home in Virginia to save on laundry costs.
But "Tall Paul", as the shy, cigar-chomping 6ft 7in banker was nicknamed by reporters, represents bygone days in more than the penny-pinching habits of a Depression-era child. Henry Kaufman, legendary Wall Street economist, describes his friend of 50 years as "a classical person. I'm not saying that he studies philosophy, but he has deep feelings about responsibilities". Another friend, hedge fund manager and philanthropist George Soros, calls him "the exemplary public servant - he embodies that old idea of civic virtue".
This reputation, and Mr Volcker's defining achievement as the banker who slayed the double-digit inflation of hte late 1970s, lent a special weight to the speech he delivered this week about the country's economic crisis. "The bright new financial system - for all its talented participants, for all its rich rewards - has failed the test of the marketplace," he told the Economic Club of New York. Despite all the noise of the volatile markets, the world listened.
"He is a towering figure," says Roger Altman, the boutique investment banker who served in the Carter administration when Mr Volcker was at the Fed. "Almost no one can speak with the authority with which he does. That authority comes from his own remarkably successful tenure at the Fed and his own integrity and his reputation for straight talk."
It is the fate of central bankers, even those who left the job more than two decades ago, to have their words parsed for hidden meanings. Some analysts saw his remarks as an attack on Ben Bernanke, the Fed's current chairman. Others contrasted Mr Volcker's critique of the new financial paradigm with the latest comments of his successor, Alan Greenspan, in defence of his own laisser-fair tenure.
Mr Volcker - reputedly not a natural politician - told a person he is close to that these perceived internecine quarrels are a mis-representation of his views. Like a good central banker, he plans to resume a gnomic silence and allow his comments to "sit out there and settle" until their meaning becomes more apparent. Some of what he said, however, is pretty clear already.
He had harsh words for private sector bankers, whose compensation practices were "most invidious of all" in the loosening of the nation's financial discipline: "the mantra of aligning incentives seems to be lost in the failure to impose symmetrical losses - or frequently any loss at all - when failures ensue". He cautioned that "it is the United States as a whole that became addicted to spending and consuming beyond its capacity to produce". Foreign money and homegrown "financial legerdemain" disguised the problem for awhile, but the man who administered the most bitter monetary medicine the country has swallowed since the second world war warned that it is again time for "painful but necessary adjustments."
Perhaps most pointedly, Mr Volcker asked why government-sponsored lenders such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were not doing more to restore confidence in the mortgage market. And he reminded his listeners that the Fed's main job is not to "take many billions of uncertain assets on to its balance sheets", but rather, as "custodian of the nation's money", to "protect its value and resist chronic pressures towards inflation".
For Mr Volcker, delivering bad news is practically a professional calling. Bob Karesh, who was a graduate student at Harvard with Mr Volcker, recalls a 1979 diner they shared after a meeting between Mr Volcker and President Jimmy Carter. The conversation had been a job interview of sorts and Mr Volcker told his old classmate he feared he had flunked it by warning that "the next Fed chairman might really have to tighten up".
Mr Carter appointed him anyway. But while Mr Volcker survived the public's fury at his punishing interest rates and the subsequent recession, the presient did not. Ronald Reagan, elected in part thanks to that dismal economic mood, appointed Mr Volcker to a second term, but then replaced him with the more expansionist Alan Greenspan.
Mr Volcker, who had divided his earlier career between government and the private sector, went back to Wall Street. Even someone as frugal as he was, he told friends, needed to make a little money. Yet before long, he was back to his true love - public service - doing everything from chairing an effort to develop international accounting standards to investigating the UN's troubled Oil for Food programme to helping police the World Bank.
"He has tackled one difficult subject after another," says Gerald Corrigan, former head of the New York Fed.
Mr Volcker's oldest confreres trace his civic commitment to his father, the city manager for their town of Teaneck, New Jersey. "Paul is not an intimate person," says Mr Kaufman, but he is known for his care for his family. All his friends mention his devotion to his late wife Barbara, who suffered debilitating rheumatoid arthritis, and whom Mr Volcker was often seen wheeling along 79th Street, near their Upper East Side home, or to private dinners.
His greatest private pleasure is fly-fishing - Mr Karesh says a whole room in his apartment given over to paraphernalia. Mr Kaufman says his old friend finally decided to initiate him into the sport about 10 years ago. The pair spent two days in the waters of the Beaverkill, New York, yielding just one small fish, which Mr Kaufman landed in the first hour. Yet Mr Kaufman recalls the experience with relish: "It was amazing how patient he was in teaching me."
Pete Peterson, the private equity billionaire, describes his long-time friend as a "lovable curmudgeon". He says Mr Volcker enjoys the fact that his colleagues "are never sure where he is going to come out" on an issue - as with his recent endorsement of Barack Obama's campaign for president. Mr Soros sums up his fellow "old fogey" thus: "He has no great ambition to wealth - he gets a lot of satisfaction from the respect he has earned."
This article appeared in the April 12-13, 2008 weekend edition of the Financial Times on page 7.
In an age when Manhattan financiers own helicopters to escape the traffic on their weekend treks to the Hamptons, Paul Volcker embodies the customs of another time. The 80-year old former chairman of the US Federal Reserve astonishes his hosts at New York dinner parties by asking where the nearest subway stop is; and, according to William Neikirk, one of his biographers, when he was running the world's most important central bank Mr Volcker ferried his dirty washing from his modest Washington crash pad to his daughter's home in Virginia to save on laundry costs.
But "Tall Paul", as the shy, cigar-chomping 6ft 7in banker was nicknamed by reporters, represents bygone days in more than the penny-pinching habits of a Depression-era child. Henry Kaufman, legendary Wall Street economist, describes his friend of 50 years as "a classical person. I'm not saying that he studies philosophy, but he has deep feelings about responsibilities". Another friend, hedge fund manager and philanthropist George Soros, calls him "the exemplary public servant - he embodies that old idea of civic virtue".
This reputation, and Mr Volcker's defining achievement as the banker who slayed the double-digit inflation of hte late 1970s, lent a special weight to the speech he delivered this week about the country's economic crisis. "The bright new financial system - for all its talented participants, for all its rich rewards - has failed the test of the marketplace," he told the Economic Club of New York. Despite all the noise of the volatile markets, the world listened.
"He is a towering figure," says Roger Altman, the boutique investment banker who served in the Carter administration when Mr Volcker was at the Fed. "Almost no one can speak with the authority with which he does. That authority comes from his own remarkably successful tenure at the Fed and his own integrity and his reputation for straight talk."
It is the fate of central bankers, even those who left the job more than two decades ago, to have their words parsed for hidden meanings. Some analysts saw his remarks as an attack on Ben Bernanke, the Fed's current chairman. Others contrasted Mr Volcker's critique of the new financial paradigm with the latest comments of his successor, Alan Greenspan, in defence of his own laisser-fair tenure.
Mr Volcker - reputedly not a natural politician - told a person he is close to that these perceived internecine quarrels are a mis-representation of his views. Like a good central banker, he plans to resume a gnomic silence and allow his comments to "sit out there and settle" until their meaning becomes more apparent. Some of what he said, however, is pretty clear already.
He had harsh words for private sector bankers, whose compensation practices were "most invidious of all" in the loosening of the nation's financial discipline: "the mantra of aligning incentives seems to be lost in the failure to impose symmetrical losses - or frequently any loss at all - when failures ensue". He cautioned that "it is the United States as a whole that became addicted to spending and consuming beyond its capacity to produce". Foreign money and homegrown "financial legerdemain" disguised the problem for awhile, but the man who administered the most bitter monetary medicine the country has swallowed since the second world war warned that it is again time for "painful but necessary adjustments."
Perhaps most pointedly, Mr Volcker asked why government-sponsored lenders such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were not doing more to restore confidence in the mortgage market. And he reminded his listeners that the Fed's main job is not to "take many billions of uncertain assets on to its balance sheets", but rather, as "custodian of the nation's money", to "protect its value and resist chronic pressures towards inflation".
For Mr Volcker, delivering bad news is practically a professional calling. Bob Karesh, who was a graduate student at Harvard with Mr Volcker, recalls a 1979 diner they shared after a meeting between Mr Volcker and President Jimmy Carter. The conversation had been a job interview of sorts and Mr Volcker told his old classmate he feared he had flunked it by warning that "the next Fed chairman might really have to tighten up".
Mr Carter appointed him anyway. But while Mr Volcker survived the public's fury at his punishing interest rates and the subsequent recession, the presient did not. Ronald Reagan, elected in part thanks to that dismal economic mood, appointed Mr Volcker to a second term, but then replaced him with the more expansionist Alan Greenspan.
Mr Volcker, who had divided his earlier career between government and the private sector, went back to Wall Street. Even someone as frugal as he was, he told friends, needed to make a little money. Yet before long, he was back to his true love - public service - doing everything from chairing an effort to develop international accounting standards to investigating the UN's troubled Oil for Food programme to helping police the World Bank.
"He has tackled one difficult subject after another," says Gerald Corrigan, former head of the New York Fed.
Mr Volcker's oldest confreres trace his civic commitment to his father, the city manager for their town of Teaneck, New Jersey. "Paul is not an intimate person," says Mr Kaufman, but he is known for his care for his family. All his friends mention his devotion to his late wife Barbara, who suffered debilitating rheumatoid arthritis, and whom Mr Volcker was often seen wheeling along 79th Street, near their Upper East Side home, or to private dinners.
His greatest private pleasure is fly-fishing - Mr Karesh says a whole room in his apartment given over to paraphernalia. Mr Kaufman says his old friend finally decided to initiate him into the sport about 10 years ago. The pair spent two days in the waters of the Beaverkill, New York, yielding just one small fish, which Mr Kaufman landed in the first hour. Yet Mr Kaufman recalls the experience with relish: "It was amazing how patient he was in teaching me."
Pete Peterson, the private equity billionaire, describes his long-time friend as a "lovable curmudgeon". He says Mr Volcker enjoys the fact that his colleagues "are never sure where he is going to come out" on an issue - as with his recent endorsement of Barack Obama's campaign for president. Mr Soros sums up his fellow "old fogey" thus: "He has no great ambition to wealth - he gets a lot of satisfaction from the respect he has earned."
LTTE: Why are we pawning our offspring's future?
The following letter to the editor appeared in the April 12-13, 2008 weekend edition of the Financial Times on page 6.
Sir, I am living a rather ordinary sort of life. But when I read the April 10 edition of the FT I felt transported to Wonderland. On the first page, I read that the bankers are claiming an epiphany. They will be good boys from now on, holding to higher standards of lending probity and reasonable pay.
Further down the page a headline claimed higher oil prices seemed likely to induce the Federal Reserve to cut rates. No inflation-fighting here. Rather, Ben Bernanke, the Fed chairman, wants to promote more borrowing and spending to keep the decrepit US economy out of the grave. Never mind that it is excess household debt that has helped propel us into today's perilous position.
And, by the way, more debt means less savings, less investment and less economic growth. Does Mr Bernanke think about the effects of all this on his grandchildren? Do we consider what the effect will be on our grandchildren? What kind of society pawns the future of its offspring?
Turning to page two, I read that a panel of banking regulators has endorsed a $300bn-$400bn federal guarantee of refinanced mortgages.
Sheila Bair, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, considers this will "avoid more dire consequences for all Americans". What dire consequences does she mean? Are they worse than increasing the national debt by more than $300bn? Are the consequences more dire for me who saves in order to weather rainy days such as we are having now courtesy of incompetent regulators who let the credit mess develop under their noses?
- Channing Wagg
Boxborough, MA 01719 US
Sir, I am living a rather ordinary sort of life. But when I read the April 10 edition of the FT I felt transported to Wonderland. On the first page, I read that the bankers are claiming an epiphany. They will be good boys from now on, holding to higher standards of lending probity and reasonable pay.
Further down the page a headline claimed higher oil prices seemed likely to induce the Federal Reserve to cut rates. No inflation-fighting here. Rather, Ben Bernanke, the Fed chairman, wants to promote more borrowing and spending to keep the decrepit US economy out of the grave. Never mind that it is excess household debt that has helped propel us into today's perilous position.
And, by the way, more debt means less savings, less investment and less economic growth. Does Mr Bernanke think about the effects of all this on his grandchildren? Do we consider what the effect will be on our grandchildren? What kind of society pawns the future of its offspring?
Turning to page two, I read that a panel of banking regulators has endorsed a $300bn-$400bn federal guarantee of refinanced mortgages.
Sheila Bair, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, considers this will "avoid more dire consequences for all Americans". What dire consequences does she mean? Are they worse than increasing the national debt by more than $300bn? Are the consequences more dire for me who saves in order to weather rainy days such as we are having now courtesy of incompetent regulators who let the credit mess develop under their noses?
- Channing Wagg
Boxborough, MA 01719 US
Thursday, April 17, 2008
Financial Times - Iceland interest rates rise to record 15.5%
This article appeared on page 2 of the Friday April 11, 2008 issue of the Financial Times.
By David Ibison
in Stockholm
Iceland has the highest interest rates in Europe after the central bank raised rates by 50 basis points to a record 15.5 per cent yesterday as it storve to restore confidence in its struggling currency and quench fears of a banking crisis.
The move puts the tiny North Atlantic nation above Turkey's rate of 15.25 per cent and comes just two weeks after it imposed an emergency 1.25 percentage point rise to 15 per cent, underscoring the depth of its problems.
On top of the aggressive action taken by the central bank, the authorieis are also considering further moves to ease investors' fears, such as co-ordinated action by Nordic central banks to provide additional liquidity, if needed.
There was disappointment that this proposed action plan was not unveiled yesterday.
"A sluggish reaction will hurt the financial system, financial stability and the authorities' credibility," said Glitnir Research, the research arm of the Icelandic bank, in a report. "Moreover, non-action will also play a large role in the credit rating of Iceland's sovereign debt, which is on negative outlook at all three major rating agencies, Moody's, Fitch and S&P."
But the central bank did make clear it was prepared to bolster Iceland's foreign exchange reserves in the near future.
"A policy rate increase in and of itself does not solve the problems that have developed in the FX swap market," it said. "Increased issuance of risk-free bonds that are accessible to foreign investors should open up other channels for currency inflow."
Confidence in the krona, Iceland's currency, has been damaged this year because of economic imbalances in the economy and fears over the viability of the banking sector. The krona has weakened by some 25 per cent against the euro this year.
The inflation rate was 8.7 per cent in March, well above the government's target of 2.5 per cent, and the central bank said yesterday it expected inflation to peak at 11 per cent by the third quarter of this year, pushing interest rates up further.
"Persistent inflation will be most damaging to indebted businesses and households and can undermine financial stability for the long term," it said. "It is therefore of paramount importance that inflation be brought under control."
Iceland's economic weaknesses have been exacerbated by the deterioration in global financial markets, which have led to a drastic reassessment of risk and undermined confidence in its highly leveraged banks.
On top of these macro-economic pressures, the authorities in Iceland also believe the country's financial markets may have been weakened via a speculative attack by international hedge funds.
By David Ibison
in Stockholm
Iceland has the highest interest rates in Europe after the central bank raised rates by 50 basis points to a record 15.5 per cent yesterday as it storve to restore confidence in its struggling currency and quench fears of a banking crisis.
The move puts the tiny North Atlantic nation above Turkey's rate of 15.25 per cent and comes just two weeks after it imposed an emergency 1.25 percentage point rise to 15 per cent, underscoring the depth of its problems.
On top of the aggressive action taken by the central bank, the authorieis are also considering further moves to ease investors' fears, such as co-ordinated action by Nordic central banks to provide additional liquidity, if needed.
There was disappointment that this proposed action plan was not unveiled yesterday.
"A sluggish reaction will hurt the financial system, financial stability and the authorities' credibility," said Glitnir Research, the research arm of the Icelandic bank, in a report. "Moreover, non-action will also play a large role in the credit rating of Iceland's sovereign debt, which is on negative outlook at all three major rating agencies, Moody's, Fitch and S&P."
But the central bank did make clear it was prepared to bolster Iceland's foreign exchange reserves in the near future.
"A policy rate increase in and of itself does not solve the problems that have developed in the FX swap market," it said. "Increased issuance of risk-free bonds that are accessible to foreign investors should open up other channels for currency inflow."
Confidence in the krona, Iceland's currency, has been damaged this year because of economic imbalances in the economy and fears over the viability of the banking sector. The krona has weakened by some 25 per cent against the euro this year.
The inflation rate was 8.7 per cent in March, well above the government's target of 2.5 per cent, and the central bank said yesterday it expected inflation to peak at 11 per cent by the third quarter of this year, pushing interest rates up further.
"Persistent inflation will be most damaging to indebted businesses and households and can undermine financial stability for the long term," it said. "It is therefore of paramount importance that inflation be brought under control."
Iceland's economic weaknesses have been exacerbated by the deterioration in global financial markets, which have led to a drastic reassessment of risk and undermined confidence in its highly leveraged banks.
On top of these macro-economic pressures, the authorities in Iceland also believe the country's financial markets may have been weakened via a speculative attack by international hedge funds.
Monday, February 18, 2008
Financial Times: Recession Risks
This article appeared in the Wed. Jan. 2, 2008 issue of the Financial Times:
Whatever the inflationary risks lurking in the US economy, recession is the fear that is keeping policymakers up at night. Rightly so. The long-resilient US faces a series of blows that will cut into growth. The residential housing market is dealing with an almost unprecedented nationwide fall in prices. Meanwhile, unstable credit markets, roiled by the subprime crisis, could have a significant impact on the availability, and price, of credit.
How big will the impact be? US growth will certainly slow. But a house price correction in itself should be manageable, unless it turns into a freefall. After all, the pain so far has been concentrated among poorer, subprime borrowers, whose spending is very small in the context of the overall economy.
The trouble is, we are heading into largely uncharted territory on housing when it comes to guessing whether consumers, already heavily burdened with debt, will lose confidence. That is a significant risk. And it could feed back into credit market problems.
Banks are already building up their own liquidity and are worried about lending to each other because of the credit market crisis. Now they also have to factor in the risk of a recession. If they are bearish, they are likely to ratchet up credit standards and reduce lending somewhat to prepare for loan losses. There is the risk of a downward spiral, where such a credit contraction in itself increases recession risk.
As the property and credit markets undergo a slow and ugly repricing, it would be little surprise if the US slipped at least briefly into recession. Stronger export growth, on the back of a weak dollar and healthy demand from the rest of the world, will struggle to offset the domestic forces at work.
Whatever the inflationary risks lurking in the US economy, recession is the fear that is keeping policymakers up at night. Rightly so. The long-resilient US faces a series of blows that will cut into growth. The residential housing market is dealing with an almost unprecedented nationwide fall in prices. Meanwhile, unstable credit markets, roiled by the subprime crisis, could have a significant impact on the availability, and price, of credit.
How big will the impact be? US growth will certainly slow. But a house price correction in itself should be manageable, unless it turns into a freefall. After all, the pain so far has been concentrated among poorer, subprime borrowers, whose spending is very small in the context of the overall economy.
The trouble is, we are heading into largely uncharted territory on housing when it comes to guessing whether consumers, already heavily burdened with debt, will lose confidence. That is a significant risk. And it could feed back into credit market problems.
Banks are already building up their own liquidity and are worried about lending to each other because of the credit market crisis. Now they also have to factor in the risk of a recession. If they are bearish, they are likely to ratchet up credit standards and reduce lending somewhat to prepare for loan losses. There is the risk of a downward spiral, where such a credit contraction in itself increases recession risk.
As the property and credit markets undergo a slow and ugly repricing, it would be little surprise if the US slipped at least briefly into recession. Stronger export growth, on the back of a weak dollar and healthy demand from the rest of the world, will struggle to offset the domestic forces at work.
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